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“PURSUANT TO A VALID PRESCRIPTION”
Brennan E. Parrish1
I. INTRODUCTION
Before diving into an abyss of drug history, certain key
points and terms of art must be clarified. First, cannabis,
marijuana, and marihuana (“cannabis” unless historical
context uses otherwise) are the same substance, occurring in
natural form as Cannabis Sativa L. 2 Second, cannabis is a
Schedule VI controlled substance––not a narcotic drug.3 While
all narcotics are controlled substances, 4 not all controlled
substances are narcotics, and it is incorrect (under Tennessee
law) to categorize naturally grown cannabis (in plant form) as

Brennan E. Parrish is an associate with his father, J. Gilbert Parrish
Jr., Attorney at Law, in Savannah, Tennessee. He would like to thank
his wife, Ann Elizabeth Parrish, for listening to countless cannabis
discussions and Professors M. Akram Faizer, Melanie M. Reid, Ann
W. Long, Brennan Wingerter, and William Gill for their excellent
guidance and assistance while studying medical cannabis
regulations at Lincoln Memorial University School of Law.
2 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(16)(A) (2019) (“‘Marijuana’
means all parts of the plant cannabis”); with The Tennessee Drug
Control Act of 1971, §2(n) (defining “marihuana” as “all parts of the
plant CANNABIS SATIVA L”); and 21 U.S.C.A. §802 (Westlaw 2019)
(“‘marihuana’ means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.”).
3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(4) (2019) (providing, “’Controlled
substance’ means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in
Schedules I through VII of §§ 39-17-403 –– 39-17-416”).
4 Id.
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a narcotic drug.5 Third, an “ultimate user” is one who may
lawfully possess a controlled substance (e.g., oxycodone,
amphetamine salts, or cannabis) by virtue of a valid
prescription.6 Forth, one-half ounce of cannabis could provide
anywhere from fifty-six days of medical use to upwards of
ninety days of use, depending on the patient and consumption
rate.7 Fifth, physicians are authorized to prescribe cannabis in
Tennessee.8

II. DISCUSSION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
Ostensibly, due to the fact that no Tennessean has yet
to be arrested for medical marijuana possession while holding
a valid prescription authorizing medicinal use, no direct case
law exists.9 Although the current statutory framework fails to
clarify inner and outer limits of key components,10 a handful
of interpretations on the “‘valid prescription’ exception”
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(17) (2019) (failing to include
marijuana or cannabis in definition of “narcotic drug”). See also 1980
Tenn. AG LEXIS 562 (concluding that “[i]t is apparent…marijuana is
not a narcotic drug.”) (emphasis added).
6 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(26) (2019) (“‘Ultimate user’ means
a person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for the
person's own use or for the use of a member of the person's
household…”).
7 If a patient took five “hits” of marijuana each day, one-half (1/2) of
an ounce would provide the patient relief for at least fifty-six days. See
JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 22 (2012) (noting that one “’hit’ is about 1/20th of a
gram of marijuana”); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(b) (2019)
(listing one-half ounce of marijuana as 14.175 grams). Thus, a patient
would use around .25 grams of marijuana for one day of relief.
8 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 (“Read together in pari materia, any
controlled substance listed in the enumerated statutes is included
within the exception of TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(a).”).
9 See, e.g., State v. Long, No. W2016-02471-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL
3203124, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018), perm. app. denied
(Sept. 17, 2018) (affirming marijuana possession charges against
appellant who had California doctor’s written “recommendation”
for “marijuana as a pain medication”).
10 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402 (2019) (failing to define
“valid prescription”). See also 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 151 at *11 (citing
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-10-404 as earlier code defining “prescription
drug”).
5
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exist. 11 Interestingly, Tennessee’s historical code versions
reveal over a century of law allowing controlled substance
possession by prescription for medical purposes. 12 To fully
understand the current code, multiple sections in parie materia
must be noted. 13 Unescapably, after reviewing Tennessee’s
controlled substance laws (historical and current), medical
cannabis possession is authorized––regardless of how a court
interprets the statute.

A. SECTION 418(A) IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND THE STATUTE’S
PLAIN MEANING AUTHORIZES MEDICAL CANNABIS
POSSESSION WITH A VALID PRESCRIPTION.

“It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess [] a
controlled substance…unless the substance was obtained
directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription.”14 This section
is clear on its face––it authorizes lawful possession if the
possessor has a valid prescription. Ultimate users may obtain
a valid prescription for medical cannabis because Tennessee
practitioners are authorized to write prescriptions for “any”
controlled substance.15 The only restraint for one seeking to
utilize medical cannabis in Tennessee is the “legitimate
medical purpose” and proof that the “‘valid prescription’
exception” applies. Statutory interpretation of the current code
version authorizes medical cannabis possession by its plain
meaning in the text.

See Part II, infra. See also 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 40 (denying
“[a]uthority of Municipality to Decriminalize Marijuana Possession”
but failing to note if medical possession is allowed via prescription).
12 See generally Hyde v. State, 174 S.W. 1127 (Tenn. 1914). See, Public
Act, 63rd Tenn. Gen. Ass. Ch. No. 91, SB 383 (Passed March 24, 1923)
(providing “[a]n act to regulate the sale, bartering, possession and
control of opium and coca leaves…”) [emphasis added].
13 See State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010)
(discussing “valid prescription exception” and noting additional
statutory sections such as TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-410).
14 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(a) (2019) (emphasis added).
15 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *10.
11
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1. THE UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE’S INTERPRETATION
DECRIMINALIZES MEDICAL POSSESSION.
When analyzing what types of controlled substance
were within § 418(a), the Attorney General noted, “Tennessee
courts have promulgated two cardinal rules of statutory
construction.” 16 The primary rule is to “follow the plain
meaning of the statute where the language is clear and
unambiguous on its face.” 17 Moreover, “where a statute is
plain and explicit in its meaning, and its enactment within the
legislative competency, the duty of the courts is simple and
obvious, namely, to say [what the law is] and obey it.” 18
Significantly, “it is not for the courts to question the wisdom of
a legislative enactment.” 19
Importantly, the current code contains another
“exception” provision in addition to § 418(a). It provides: “It is
an exception to this part if the person lawfully possessed the
controlled substance as otherwise authorized by this part and
title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4.” 20 Chapter 11 (“Narcotic
Drugs and Drug Control”) contains two prescription
possession exceptions in part III. Section 302 (“Handlers of
controlled substances”) embodies the historical exception
allowing possession via a prescription 21 and § 308
(“Prescription
Requirements”)
specifically
addresses
restrictions on more stringently regulated controlled
substances.22
Relative to medical marijuana, § 308(d) provides: “A
controlled substance included in Schedule V shall not be
distributed or dispensed other than for a medical purpose.”23
This is noteworthy because the prior subsections only refer to
schedule I, II, III and IV. 24 Thus, the perplexing question
immerges, why does the statute not address schedule VI (or
Id. at *4; see also 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33.
Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tenn. 2001).
18 Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. 319, 321-22 (1841).
19 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *4 (citing Hamblen Cty. Educ. Ass'n v.
Hamblen Cty. Bd. of Educ., 892 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994) (citing Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1977))).
20 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-427 (2019).
21 See discussion infra Part II (i).
22 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308 (2019).
23 TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308(d) (2019).
24 TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308 (2019).
16
17
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VII) in any form? Due to the omission of any reference to
Schedule VI,25 it is difficult to determine if the Code provision
would implicitly include or exclude cannabis; however, read
in parie materia, the distinction is moot as a physician can
prescribe “any” controlled substance.26

2. THE STANDARD DEFINITION OF “PRESCRIPTION”
CLEARLY DECRIMINALIZES POSSESSION BASED ON ITS
PLAIN MEANING.

Oddly, the current Code does not define
“prescription.” 27 If a statutory term “is not defined in the
statute, nor [] defined by Tennessee Courts” then to
“interpret[] the meaning of a word or phrase in a statute, the
court may use dictionary definitions.”28 Relative to § 418(a)’s
medical context, the word prescription (in noun form as in the
statute) is “a written direction for a therapeutic or corrective
agent….”29 This definition beckons to the everyday reader that
the prescription establishes lawful ownership over a
controlled substance, as long as it is valid. Thus, under the
statute’s plain meaning, a “prescription” is a written direction
for a therapeutic agent, establishing a right to possess a drug
for an amount of time authorized by statute. That drug is
cannabis and the amount of time is indefinite.30

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-427 (2019).
2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *10.
27 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11301 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-236 (2019).
28 McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)
(citing State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tenn. 2010)).
29 PRESCRIPTION, Merriam-Webster (last visited March 4, 2019)
(emphasis added).
30 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-236 (2019) (failing to include
“expiration date” as a required entry for a valid prescription). Thus,
once a prescription meets the requirements, possession appears
authorized indefinitely.
25
26
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3. PHYSICIANS MAY LEGALLY PRESCRIBE CANNABIS
BECAUSE WHEN READ IN PARI MATERIA, ANY
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IS WITHIN § 418(A)’S
EXCEPTION.
In reviewing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(a), the
Attorney General explained:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-402(4) defines a
controlled substance as a “drug, substance, or
immediate precursor in Schedules I through VI
of §§ 39-17-403 - 39-17-415 inclusive.” Read
together in pari materia, any controlled substance
listed in the enumerated statutes is included within
the exception of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17418(a).31
Clearly, cannabis is within the scope of the physician’s
authority to prescribe.

B. ALTHOUGH § 418(A) IS NOT AMBIGUOUS, IF IT WERE,
CANNONS OF CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZE MEDICAL
CANNABIS POSSESSION WITH A VALID PRESCRIPTION.

If the text is considered ambiguous, interpretation
favors medical cannabis in Tennessee. Mindful of Albert
Einstein’s saying, “If you want to know the future, look to the
past,” Tennessee’s historical drug laws aid in understanding §
418(a). Although alcohol is not a controlled substance, at one
point in time it hardly differed from cannabis. During
prohibition, possession of alcohol was federally banned; yet,
Tennessee physicians were authorized to prescribe alcohol to
patients.32 If a patient had a prescription, they could obtain the
substance from a “druggist” who held the substance for
medical purposes. 33 Ironically, at one point in time, alcohol
2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *10 (emphasis added).
See Tennessee Code, 11 § 11219(2) (1932) (“Reception and
possession by druggists, hospitals, and manufactures for certain
specified purposes”).
33 See Motlow v. State, 145 S.W. 177, 181 (Tenn. 1911) (denying relief
for proprietor of Jack Daniels distillery claiming whiskey was
manufactured for medical resale); see also Slaven v. State, 257 S.W. 90,
31
32
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could not be sold in Tennessee and was imported across state
lines to avoid problems from local producers selling illegally.34
Undeniably, Tennessee’s medical exception during federal
bans on alcohol favors medical cannabis possession via a
prescription––irrespective of the federal bans on cannabis. 35
Provided the ultimate user obtains a valid prescription, the
historical analysis of Tennessee’s drug laws showcase a State
policy favoring lawful possession of medical cannabis.

1. TENNESSEE’S HISTORICAL CODE SHOWS A CLEAR
POLICY OF AUTHORIZING POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH A VALID PRESCRIPTION.

In 1857, drug regulations concerned only opium and
coca leaves (of which morphine and cocaine may be derived,
respectively). 36 Pre-1900’s regulations focused on labeling
requirements, with little focus on medical possession of a
controlled substance. 37 Importantly, the possession by
prescription exception appears in the 1923 Code.38 It excluded
from prosecution, “any person having in his possession or
under his control any of the aforesaid drugs which has or have
been prescribed or dispended by a physician, dentist, or
veterinary surgeon registered in the State of Tennessee….”39
91 (Tenn. 1923) (citing 1917 Act containing medical exceptions for
alcohol use by “bona fide patients” during prohibition).
34 Slaven, 257 S.W. at 91.
35 See also Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (2009) (discussing legal status of state
medical marijuana regulations).
36 See Tenn. Code Pt. IV, Tit. I, Ch. 7, Art. II, § 4831 (1857) (noting
laudanum and morphine derived from opium as drugs subject to
labeling regulation).
37 Notably, opium and coco leaves were also mentioned in the 1923
code version in which the drugs could be possessed pursuant to a
valid prescription; See Tenn. Code Pt., I Tit., 14 Ch., 21, § 6619(d)
(1932).
38 See Public Act, 63rd Tenn. Gen. Assembly Chapter No. 91, Senate
Bill No. 383 (Passed March 24, 1923) (providing, “An act to regulate
the sale, bartering, possession and control of opium and coca
leaves…”).
39 Compare Tenn. Code 18 § 6585 (1932) (listing drugs such as “alpha
or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis indica, and chloral hydrate”);
with Tenn. Code 91 § 6619 (1932) (noting opium and coco leaves as
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Thus, reviewing Tennessee’s historical drug regulations, two
state interests are clear: (1) prohibit unauthorized use of
dangerous drugs and (2) provide authorized possession of
drugs for medical use.
Near the end of prohibition, Tennessee modified the
law by incorporating new language relative to drug
possession. With wording similar to the current law, the 1932
Code exempted from prosecution those in “possession” of
drugs prescribed by a state-registered physician.40 Similarly,
the 1955 version also contained the possession by prescription
exception. 41 Although cannabis was mentioned in the 1932
Code, it was not formally defined until 1955. 42 The 1955
definition (mirroring the current Code) defines cannabis as:
“all parts of the plant cannabis sativa L….”43 The 1955 Code is
clear––cannabis is not a narcotic drug under Tennessee Law.44

2. WHEN § 418’S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE WAS CODIFIED, IT
CLEARLY AUTHORIZED MEDICAL CANNABIS POSSESSION
BASED ON THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND SCHEDULE
PLACEMENT.45

“Pursuant to, a valid prescription” first appeared in
the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971. 46 This critical link
answers many questions concerning marijuana, cannabis, or

sole drugs requiring a prescription for lawful possession); and Tenn.
Code 91 § 2(d) (1923) (regulating possession of opium and coca
leaves).
40 See Tennessee Code, 21 § 6619(d) (1932). Accord Tennessee Code, 21
§ 6619(d) (1934) (Superseded by, Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, Tenn.
Code 21A § 6632.1 (1937, Ch. 255, § 24).
41 See Tenn. Code 52 § 1312 (1955).
42 See Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, Tenn. Code 13 § 52-1302(14) (Acts
1937, Ch. 255 § 24).
43 Tenn. Code 52 § 1302(14) (1955).
44 Id. Accord 1980 Tenn. AG LEXIS 562 (“It is apparent…marijuana is
not a narcotic drug.”).
45 This heading references “§ 418” for consistency and clarity. The
actual codified provision with the original language is located in the
Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 15(c)(3).
46 See Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971, Ch. 163, HB 522.
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“marihuana,” and its application to our current Code. 47 For
example, it explains why cannabis was included in Schedule
VI.48 The Act provides:
There is hereby established a Schedule VI for
the classification of substances which the
Commissioner of Mental Health upon the
agreement of the Commissioner of Public
Health, upon considering the factors set forth in
Section 3(a) of this Act, decides should not be
included in Schedules I through V. The
controlled substances included in Schedule VI
are: (1) Marihuana.49
Notably, marihuana is the sole drug listed in Schedule
VI in the 1971 Code. 50 Similarly, the current Code includes
only marijuana and cannabis derivatives in Schedule VI.51 The
factors in Section 3(a) determine a controlled substance’s
appropriate placement and include:
(1) the actual or relative potential for abuse; (2)
the scientific evidence of its pharmacological
effect, if known; (3) the state of current scientific
knowledge regarding the substance; (4) the
history and current pattern of abuse; (5) the
scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6)
the risk to the public health; (7) the potential of
the substance to produce psychic or
physiological dependence liability; and (8)
whether the substance is an immediate
precursor of a substance already controlled
under this section.52

47The

Act created: “A comprehensive system of drug and drug abuse
control for Tennessee…relative to contraband drugs; and [provides]
certain penalties and for rehabilitation and treatment.”
48 Contra, Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Westlaw
2019) (noting Schedule I placement).
49 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 15 (emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-415 (2019) (listing marijuana and its
derivatives in Schedule VI).
52 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 3(a).
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While Section 15 places “marihuana” in Schedule VI, it
fails to provide any further explanation as to why or what the
commission’s actual findings were on the substance. Based on
the legislative history’s text, the commissions must have
determined marihuana had: (1) “low potential for abuse”
relative to Schedule V substances; (2) “currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States”; and (3)
“limited physical dependence or psychological dependence
relative” to Schedule V drugs––because if the commissions felt
otherwise, marihuana would have been placed in Schedule V–
–not Schedule VI.53 Thus, even if marihuana is not expressly
stated as having Schedule V qualities, it implicitly must have
these requirements by virtue of being in a lesser schedule
placement. Schedule VI placement shows the legislature’s
informed decision evidencing little concern relative to
marijuana use and potential public harm.54
In addition to 1971’s schedule placement, the
Tennessee Drug Control Act appears to be the first authority
to establish lesser penalties for marijuana possession. 55
Specifically, “casual exchanges” of “marihuana, not in excess
of one-half (1/2) ounce, for no remuneration…” were reduced
from felony to misdemeanor.56 Here, the 1971 Code embodies
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(b)’s express language regarding
quantity.57 Although the 1971 Code is not a verbatim recitation
of the current Code, the substantive content and application to
possession is hardly distinguishable, allowing offenders to be
charged with a lesser misdemeanor possession charge.
Compare Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §5 (listing Schedule I
drugs with “high potential for abuse” and “no accepted medical
use”); with Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §13 (listing Schedule
V drugs as having “low potential for abuse…current accepted
medical use…[and] limited physical dependence” relative to
precursor substances); and Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 15
(failing to delineate any findings relative to marijuana and Section
3(a) factors).
54 Cf., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-405 (2019) (noting drugs in Schedule
I have high potential for abuse).
55 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 25(a)(3).
56 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 25(b)(1). See also 2012 Tenn.
AG LEXIS 33 (defining “casual exchange” as “the spontaneous
passing of a small amount of an illegal drug, regardless whether
money is received for the exchange of the illegal drug.”).
57 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §25(b)(1).
53
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Notably, the possession via prescription language is verbatim
to the current Code.58 The only differences in the provisions
appear to be omitting “intentionally” from the mens rea of the
former statute and the addition of “causally exchange” to the
actus reus of the latter.59 Invariably, the 1971 Code yields the
most practical legislative insight on the statute.
As a matter of thoroughness, it should be noted that
the current Criminal Code has been modified since 1971;
however, no provisions have been modified relative to:
naturally grown marijuana;60 the valid prescription exception;
or casual exchanges.61 Moreover, audio recordings from the
legislative floor debates on the Tennessee Drug Control Act of
1971 do not shed any light on marijuana’s placement or the
valid prescription exception.62 Notably, Tennessee’s Criminal
Code undertook a major overhaul in 1988. 63 Although
additional enactments to the Code have occurred since the
primary provisions were enacted in 1971, “pursuant to a valid
prescription” remains unchanged. Thus, mindful of the
historical exceptions allowing possession by a valid
prescription, medical use of marijuana appears fully
authorized by the legislature, provided that the user obtains a
valid prescription.

Compare Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §25(b) (noting
“unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice”); with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17418(a) (2019) (same).
59 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(a) (2019).
60 Modern additions to the code regarding new forms of cannabis
(e.g., “tetrahydrocannabinols” and “synthetic equivalents” derived
from cannabis are omitted from discussion due to there non-organic
origins. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-455 (2019) (proscribing
“manufacture [of] marijuana concentrate by a process which use[s]
inherently hazardous substance” as a Class E felony).
61 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(b) (1982); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-418(b) (1988).
62 To ensure thorough research, audio recordings discussing HB 522
were purchased from the Tennessee State Library and Archives.
Although references to the simple possession statutes were made in
the discussion, there was little insight relative to medical use of
controlled substances obtained from the recording.
63 See Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17401 (1988).
58
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3. ARGUING § 418(A)’S COMMA IS “OBVIOUSLY
MISPLACED” FAILS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
LEGISLATIVE INACTION.
Justice Brock’s concurring opinion in Sanderson takes
an interesting viewpoint on Tennessee’s statutory provision.64
Although contrary to the historical policy of the Criminal
Code (authorizing possession via a prescription) Justice
Brock’s concurrence asserts:
The comma between the words “to” and “a” is
obviously misplaced and should be placed
between the words “of” and “a,” the meaning
being that lawful possession of a controlled
substance must be obtained either directly from
a physician or from a pharmacist pursuant to a
valid prescription or order of a physician.65
It is highly unlikely that the comma placement in
Tennessee’s
prescription
exception
was
“obviously
misplaced.” Without question, reading the statute as Justice
Brock asserts might make the provision easier to apply in the
legal analysis, but it is not up to the judicial department to
question the acts of the legislature. 66 Simply put, Sanderson
was decided forty-two years ago. If Justice Brock’s assertions
were correct, why would the legislature have yet to correct the
error? To ask is to answer, and considering the language
remains unchanged, it is highly unlikely the comma was
“obvious misplaced” when: (1) first written in 1971; (2) recodified in 1982 and 1988; and (3) printed in the current
Code.67
Nonetheless, the doctrine of legislative inaction applies
to the “obviously misplaced” comma in the 1971 Code. In
See State v. Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tenn. 1977).
Id. at 239, n.1 (Brock, J., concurring).
66 Reynolds v. Gray Med. Inv'rs, LLC., No. E2017-02403-COA-R9-CV,
2018 WL 6504086, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018) (citing
Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 704 (Tenn. 2013)).
67 Compare Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 25(b) (codifying
language in Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237); with TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-6-417(b) (1982) (incorporating language and punctuation
verbatim); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-417(b) (1988) (containing
same); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-418(a) (2018) (same).
64
65
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most circumstances, “inaction [of the legislative department] is
generally irrelevant to the interpretation of statutes.”68 There is
however, a “limited exception” to this principle “when the
legislature’s inaction follows judicial interpretation of a
statute.”69 Specifically, the doctrine:
Presumes that, had the legislature disagreed
with a prior judicial construction of a statute, it
would have amended the statute accordingly. It
is not a rule of law; rather, it is a judicial
principle that permits—but does not compel—a
presumption of legislative acquiescence in a
prior judicial interpretation of the statute.70
“Given this long-standing judicial application of the
statute,” one “can presume that the Legislature agrees” with
the statutory application as it occurred in Sanderson, “and
there is no authority to suggest otherwise.” 71 The assertion
that the comma is misplaced is incorrect in light of the
doctrine of legislative inaction. Finally, based on the wellknown principle that it is not for the courts to “alter or amend
statutes or substitute [their] policy judgment for that of the
Legislature,” the current version of the statute appears to be
written consistent with the legislative department’s desires.72

C. ALTHOUGH § 418(A) AUTHORIZES MEDICAL CANNABIS
POSSESSION, THE PATIENT MUST PROVE THE “‘VALID
PRESCRIPTION’ EXCEPTION” APPLIES TO AVOID CRIMINAL
PENALTIES.

Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, 513 S.W.3d 427,
443 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co.,
172 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Tenn. 2005)).
69 Id. at 444.
70 Id. See, e.g., Goodman v. HBD Indus., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 373, 379
(Tenn. 2006) (noting that “the Legislature has also expressed its tacit
acceptance of the decision, in that it has chosen not to overrule it by
statute.”).
71 Dedmon v. Steelman, 535 S.W.3d 431, 462 n.29 (Tenn. 2017) (citing
Hardy, 513 S.W.3d at 444 (Tenn. 2017)).
72 Reynolds, 2018 WL 6504086, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018)
(citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 704 (Tenn. 2013)).
68
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Even though Tennessee’s current Code decriminalizes
an ultimate user’s medical cannabis possession pursuant to a
valid prescription, the patient (as the defendant) has the
burden to show the “‘valid prescription’ exception” applies.73
The patient must show that there is a legitimate medical
purpose 74 and the prescription must be: (1) “issued by a
licensed practitioner”; (2) “acting in good faith”; (3) “in accord
with accepted medical standards”; and (4) “the person
obtaining the prescription” must act “in good faith…free from
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”75

1. “INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY” DOES NOT APPLY
TO § 418(A)’S POSSESSION EXCEPTION.
As noted in Sanderson, the legislature did not intend to
place a “protective cloak around anyone who procures a
prescription…by fraud, misrepresentation or deceit.” 76 Not
surprisingly, one claiming to be exempt from prosecution
must prove innocence to avoid guilt (and abuse of the
exception). 77 The Duke court dismissed the defendant’s
possession charges under the valid prescription exception
after the defendant showed “by a preponderance of the
evidence” that the substance at issue “had been prescribed by
a physician.” 78 Although the statutes fail to list what the
burden of proof is to rebut the unlawful possession
presumption, it appears to be the civil “more likely than not”
standard according to Duke. 79 Thus, any medical cannabis
patient must realize: (1) he or she can be arrested for possession
and (2) innocence must be proven.

See TENN. CODE ANN. §53-11-410(a) (2018) (“The burden of proof of
any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.”). See also
State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. January 21,
2010).
74 State v. Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tenn. 1977).
75 Id. at 239. Accord State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2010) (citing Sanderson in discussion of the “‘valid
prescription’ exception”).
76 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 238.
77 Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d at 68.
78 Duke v. State, 366 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1963).
79 See id. But see TENN. CODE ANN. §53-11-410 (2018) (failing to list
burden of persuasion requirement).
73
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2. THERE MUST BE A LEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE FOR
THE EXCEPTION TO APPLY.

The threshold requirement to establish a prescription’s
validity is that the prescription be issued for a “legitimate
medical purpose.”80 Factors aiding the legitimacy analysis are:
factual circumstances of the actual patient and medical
justification for the substance based on the claimed illness.81
Although these two factors are not expressly mentioned in
case law, they are clearly the most significant factors in the
legitimate medical purpose analysis.
The leading case on the “‘valid prescription’
exception” is State v. Sanderson.82 The defendant in Sanderson
was the sister of the female patient.83 Acting “on behalf of her
sister” the defendant procured a prescription in her sister’s
name for a Schedule IV diet pill “sight unseen” asserting that,
“her sister [] had a weight problem.”84 Notably, diet pills were
often abused as an “upper” yet the physician wrote the
prescription for the defendant’s sister without confirming if
any actual need for the substance existed. 85 While the
defendant was a regular patient of the physician, the actual
patient (defendant’s sister) had never visited (or even met) the
physician.86
Analyzing the “legitimate medical purpose” for the
sister’s prescription, the Court looked at the factual
circumstances of the patient. The court found it most
suspicious that a female patient, weighing 115lbs and being (5)
five foot (8) eight inches tall, could have a legitimate need for
prescription diet pills. 87 Consulting numerous anatomical
sources, the Court concluded: “this ‘fat lady’ weighs a
minimum of 40 pounds less than the average woman of her

Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237 (analyzing the “valid prescription
exception” in §52-1432(b) of The Tennessee Drug Control Act of
1971).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 236.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 237.
85 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237-38.
86 Id. at 236-37.
87 Id. at 237-38.
80
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age and height….”88 Unsurprisingly, there was “no legitimate
use for diet pills” by the “skinny” patient and the prescription
rendered was not “sound medical practice.” 89 Additionally,
the Court noted the pills were left “at a beer joint with the
label removed” and clearly “never designed for any legitimate
purpose.”90
The claimed illness and medical justification played a
strong role in Sanderson. While diet pills differ from cannabis–
–it is clear that a court will inquire into the medical
justifications for any controlled substance prescription. 91
Damming defendant’s medical justification in Sanderson was
the physician’s testimony, “I don’t know anything about these
drugs.”92 Unsurprisingly, the Court used the Physicians’ Desk
Reference because it was an “authoritative and standard
treatise” on medical substances. 93 Since the drug was for
weight loss, the Court stated that there was no illness
justifying the patient’s prescription, and accordingly, no
medical justification for the patient to use the substance. 94
Thus, under Sanderson, medical cannabis patients need: (1) an
illness justifying cannabis and (2) proof that “sound medical
practice” supports issuing a prescription for the illness.95

3. THE PATIENT MUST SHOW FOUR ELEMENTS TO INVOKE
THE VALID PRESCRIPTION EXCEPTION.
Assuming there is a legitimate medical purpose for the
prescription, a patient must show the “‘valid prescription’

Id. at 238 (citing sources such as the World Almanac Newspaper
Enterprise Association, Factbook on Man: From Birth to Death, and
Book of Health––A Medical Encyclopedia for Everyone) (emphasis
added).
89 Id. at 237-38.
90 Id. at 238.
91 See id. at 237 (noting “good faith” requirement of physician to
prescribe medicine “to relieve” ailments of the patient such as pain
and suffering”).
92 Id.
93 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237.
94 See id. at 238 (noting that the defendant failed to call the sister as a
witness which would have allowed the jury to “observ[e] first-hand
whether [the patient] was in need” of the substance prescribed).
95 Id.
88
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exception” applies. 96 As the current statutory language is
verbatim to that in Sanderson, nothing more is required.97 The
Sanderson court clearly held:
The “valid prescription” exception [applies]
when the prescription is issued by a licensed
practitioner, acting in good faith and in accord with
accepted medical standards and when the person
obtaining the prescription is also acting in good faith
and is free from fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
A “valid prescription” presupposes ethical and
prudent conduct on the part of the practitioner
and honest motivation on the part of the
patient.98
The first element requires issuance by a licensed
practitioner 99 and it is met when the patient procures the
prescription from a licensed Tennessee practitioner. 100 The
second element of good faith (discussed at length in Sanderson)
is specific to the physician’s conduct––not the patient. 101 In
Sanderson, the physician did not act “in good faith.” 102
Specifically, the physician’s “gross negligence” in prescribing
a weight loss pill without even seeing the patient sufficiently

Id. at 239.
See Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971, supra note 67.
98 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 239 (emphasis added).
99 Cf, State v. Long, No. W2016-02471-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3203124
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018) (discussing marijuana possession
charges against appellant with California doctor’s written
recommendation of medical marijuana for pain).
100 Under the current code, “Practitioner” means: “A physician,
dentist, optometrist, veterinarian, scientific investigator or other
person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute,
dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a
controlled substance in the course of professional practice or
research in this state; or A pharmacy, hospital or other institution
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense,
conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice or research in this
state.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(23) (2019) (emphasis added).
101 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 238.
102 Id.
96
97
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showed a lack of good faith.103 Overall, the determination of a
physician’s good faith is made on a case-by-case analysis.104
The third Sanderson element is perhaps the largest
hurdle for medical cannabis patients. It requires showing
medical cannabis is “in accord with accepted medical
standards.”105 Perhaps due to the federal cannabis ban, not all
known medical benefits are readily available. Plus, even if
another state’s legislation shows medical condition benefits
from medical cannabis, it would not be binding on a
Tennessee court.106 Undeniably, a patient may assert accepted
medical standards support cannabis by official treatise (e.g.,
physician’s desk reference). 107 Critically, as thirty-four states
now allow medical cannabis, it is likely in accordance with
accepted medical standards.108
Finally, the fourth Sanderson element requires “the
person obtaining the prescription” show “good faith” in
obtaining the prescription without “fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” 109 Again, the patient must actually need
medical cannabis. Additionally, the patient must use the drug
in a manner evidencing good faith. Thus, the patient loading
up cannabis in a “carburation mask”110 for a weekend social
with friends (who do not have a cannabis prescription) would
Id. at 237.
See Duke v. State, 366 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1963) (failing to find or
discuss any lack of good faith by physician prescribing dolophine
solution to defendant who “told th[e] doctor that he was a “drug
addict”).
105 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 239.
106 See Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016 § 2(13)
(listing “qualifying medical conditions” such as: Cancer, glaucoma,
Tourette's syndrome, Crohn's disease, ulcerative colitis, posttraumatic stress disorder, cachexia or wasting syndrome; peripheral
neuropathy; seizures (including characteristic of epilepsy); or severe
and persistent muscle spasms).
107 See Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237 (citing physician’s desk
reference); see also Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, p. 511, (5th Edition)
(2013) (noting cannabis may be used to treat nausea and vomiting
caused by chemotherapy, anorexia, and weight loss in individuals
with AIDS).
108 State Medical Marijuana Laws, National Conference of State
Legislatures, (March 3rd, 2019).
109 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 239. Accord Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d at 68.
110 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(12)(C)(iv) (2018).
103
104
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not be acting in good faith.111 Interestingly, the “paraphernalia
exception” would however allow such use by an ultimate user
with a valid prescription.112
Out of an abundance of caution, any patient seeking to
invoke the valid prescription exception must ensure the
prescription meets statutory requirements for validity.
Although not mentioned in Sanderson, it is especially
important for a medical cannabis prescription that the
quantity not exceed one-half ounce (the amount specifically
mentioned in § 418(b)). The Code authorizes prescriptions in
handwritten form, but it will require the physician’s writing to
be legible, signed, and dated.113 Additionally, the prescription
must also contain: (1) prescribing physician’s name; (2) drug
prescribed; (3) drug strength; (4) drug quantity; and (5) proper
drug instructions (e.g., “this substance should not be used in a
manner that violates the law, such as operating a motor
vehicle”). 114 If a patient shows these requirements, then
criminal sanctions for medical cannabis possession should not
be imposed.

III. CONCLUSION
Regardless of how § 418 is interpreted, the plain
language contained in it authorizes possession of medical
cannabis if the ultimate user possesses a valid prescription.
Tennessee practitioners (including physicians) are authorized
to prescribe cannabis. The prescription’s validity hinges on
compliance with case law and statutory provisions. Failure to
meet these requirements will result in criminal penalties as the
burden is on the patient to prove the valid prescription
exception applies. Where a defendant/patient proves (by a
preponderance of the evidence) cannabis in his/her
possession is held pursuant to a valid prescription, he or she is
exempt from criminal sanctions under the current statutory
See Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 238.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-425 (2018) (saying paraphernalia is
unlawful “except when used or possessed…by a person
authorized…to…possess a controlled substance”) [emphasis added]. If
cannabis in a pipe, water-pipe, bong, etc. is possessed pursuant to a
valid prescription, then the use of the corresponding paraphernalia
appears exempt from criminal sanctions.
113 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-236 (2019).
111
112

114

Id.
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framework. Although one may be arrested and tried, the
appropriate ruling should be acquittal. Thus, it appears that
medical cannabis possession is effectively decriminalized
when possession is pursuant to a valid prescription.

